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T
he apocryphal warning of Yeats car-
ries a particular resonance for the U.S.
securities markets. Beset by scandals
involving both the leadership and the
membership, the New York Stock
Exchange (NYSE) has struggled to
find its bearings in a more demanding market-
place. And the Exchange is not alone in its efforts
to find direction. The Nasdaq has found it increas-
ingly difficult to compete with the host of new
competitors invading its traditional dealer market.
These competitors, in turn, have added new
dimensions to the competitive calculus, such as
competition over print revenues and rivalries over
execution speeds. The advent of decimalization
has transformed the pricing of securities, and
technology has rendered the current market link-
age system increasingly problematic. Indeed, even
the ownership of the markets is changing, with
Nasdaq now a publicly traded company and the
regional exchanges contemplating public offer-
ings. These ownership changes, combined with
the recent problems involving oversight of trading
practices, have brought into question the entire
issue of self-regulation of the securities markets.
The forces besetting these markets are converg-
ing from all sides.
In this paper, I set out some of the very impor-
tant issues surrounding the evolving structure of
the U.S. equity markets. My goal is not to deter-
mine the “new order” for the markets but rather to
set out those issues that are at odds with the tradi-
tional structure characterizing both market gover-
nance and market operation. That structure, which
was the foundation for the National Market System
(NMS), envisioned a market characterized by a
dominant exchange competing via market linkages
with several smaller regional exchanges, a single
dealer market operating under the auspices of the
National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD),
and self-regulation undertaken by the cooperatively
run exchanges and the member-owned Nasdaq.
With the current market structure now vastly dif-
ferent, the NMS framework is faltering, and the
search is on for a new “center” for both firms and
markets alike.
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
has entered this debate with the publication of
Regulation NMS, a four-part proposal of changes to
the existing NMS structure (see SEC 2004). While
addressing some specific problems with the NMS, I
will argue in this paper that these proposals do not go
far enough to address the new environment charac-
terizing the U.S. equity markets. A particular omission
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As discussed by many authors (see, for example,
Seligman 2003a and Blume 2000), these principles,
while laudable, were ill defined and often conflict-
ing in practice. The availability of information with
respect to quotations, for example, has been criti-
cized for allowing regional exchanges or alternative
trading systems (ATSs) to free-ride on the price
discovery efforts of other markets. Similarly, Macey
and O’Hara (1997) argue that best execution of
orders may be virtually undefinable (let alone unat-
tainable) if features such as speed of execution are
included in the execution metric. Perhaps a more
fundamental criticism of the NMS principles was
that it essentially implied a one-size-fits-all frame-
work in which the disparate needs of traders were
sublimated to the view that all orders would have
equal standing.
Achieving a functioning single national market
required some mechanism for linking the existing
markets together. One proposal to do so was a con-
solidated limit order book, or CLOB, in which all
orders would be queued in a strict price-time prior-
ity basis. However, the CLOB structure faced sub-
stantial opposition and was never implemented.
Instead, an electronic linkage of markets, the inter-
market trading system, or ITS, was adopted in which
orders would first be routed to an exchange and then
be sent by a specialist or market maker to another
exchange or market quoting a better price. The ITS
was facilitated by the development of the consoli-
dated tape, which provided for unified reporting of
all trades in NYSE-listed securities occurring both
on the floor and elsewhere. The Consolidated Tape
Association (CTA) was formed to operate the sys-
tem, with the ownership of the CTA originally shared
unequally by the NYSE, the American Stock Exchange
(Amex), the NASD, and three regional exchanges.
(For an excellent discussion of the founding of the
CTA, see Seligman 2003a.) Consolidated quote data
become available soon after. The revenue from sell-
ing this trade and quote information would grow
substantially, providing upwards of 30 percent of the
NYSE’s revenue in later years.
Seligman (2003a) argues that this ITS approach
to a national market retained the central role of the
NYSE by allowing (some would say forcing) orders
onto the exchange floor for possible price improve-
ment by floor brokers before they were routed to
other destinations. A second consequence of the ITS
was that only price priority mattered; the specialist
could match the better price offered elsewhere and
still retain the order, an outcome not consistent with
the price-time priority of a CLOB. Moreover, the
only dimension of execution quality incorporated
is any recognition of the problems posed by changes in
exchanges’ governance for the self-regulatory struc-
ture of equity market oversight. I offer some examples
of alternative regulatory approaches that might be
more consistent with this new competitive environ-
ment. I conclude that the piecemeal approach of
Regulation NMS misses the point that a new vision
is needed for market regulation, one more consistent
with the economic realities of today’s markets.
I set the stage for my analysis by briefly detailing
the regulatory and governance structures that have
characterized the U.S. equity markets for the past
quarter-century. I outline the original goals and
structure of the NMS, set out some of the realities of
the current market structure, and discuss the chang-
ing governance of exchanges. I then raise a series of
issues relating to three overarching questions in mar-
ket structure: Specifically, how should markets com-
pete? How should they be linked? And how should
they be regulated? Within these broad questions are
a wide range of specific topics such as the role of
price-time priority, liquidity rebates, tape revenue,
pricing increments, and access fees as well as more
general issues such as the viability of self-regulation. 
Old Visions, New Realities
A
natural starting point for our analysis is the pas-
sage in 1975 of the Securities Act Amendments,
authorizing the SEC to facilitate the establishment
of a National Market System for securities. The
Securities Act articulated an explicit series of prin-
ciples to guide the development of a national market
but gave no specific guidelines regarding the mar-
ket structure needed to attain these goals. Nonethe-
less, the vision was to establish a single national
market system that would allow for (1) economically
efficient execution of securities transactions, (2) fair
competition between brokers and dealers, (3) avail-
ability of information with respect to quotations and
transparency, (4) the opportunity to execute orders
without the participation of a dealer, and (5) best
execution of orders.1
A particular challenge confronting U.S. securi-
ties markets is how to deal with the transition
of markets from cooperatively owned organi-
zations to profit-seeking publicly listed firms.1. See Section 11A(a)(1)(C) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. 78-1(a)(1)(C).
2. Price priority within the Nasdaq market dates to the imposition of the Manning Rules in 1994.
3. This disparity led the SEC to issue Regulation ATS, which increased the reporting and regulatory responsibilities for some
alternative systems.
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into this framework was price; factors such as speed
of execution were deemed of little consequence in
the decades before the advent of electronic trading.
To enforce this price priority structure, the “trade-
through” rule was adopted, requiring orders to be
routed to the setting quoting the best price.
Interestingly, the trade-through rule did not apply to
stocks in the over-the-counter market. Instead,
Nasdaq-listed stocks were required to meet price
priority within a market but not across markets.2
This distinction would provide a greater ability for
electronic communication networks (ECNs) and
other trading platforms to compete for order flow in
Nasdaq stocks than was the case for listed stocks.
The ITS system was criticized almost from the
beginning as being an incomplete solution. While
changes have been made to the system in the inter-
vening years, the basic constructs of the system
remain. Indeed, in 1999 SEC Chairman Arthur
Levitt reportedly called the system archaic, a criti-
cism even more true today. In late February 2004,
the SEC responded to some of these criticisms with
the distribution for public comment of Regulation
NMS. This proposed regulation outlines changes to
various aspects of the NMS system, the specifics of
which will be addressed further in the next section.
What may be useful to contemplate, however, is
how the trading environment has changed since the
establishment of the NMS. Perhaps no force has
been more important in undermining the NMS struc-
ture than technology. While the original system envi-
sioned electronic transmission of orders, it clearly
did not anticipate the advent of electronic competi-
tors in the form of ECNs. ECNs are essentially elec-
tronic limit order books that allow customer orders
to interact with each other. With no specialist or
market maker required to complete the trade,
orders in ECNs can execute almost instantaneously.
Moreover, the development of smart routers has
allowed traders to send orders to numerous trading
venues. With the cost of technology dropping ever
lower, new trading systems can be developed by a
wide range of providers, dramatically expanding the
number of potential competitors. The NMS system
envisioned a more constrained world, populated by
a handful of exchanges and the NASD.
The ability to create alternative trading systems
undermined a second tenet of the NMS—the view
that all orders were to be treated equally. While buy-
ers and sellers each desire best execution for their
orders, what this means can differ dramatically
depending upon the characteristics of the traders.
Institutional investors trading large orders, for
example, may be more concerned with the price
impact of their trades than they are with the size of
the bid-ask spread. ITG’s Posit, an ATS, and Instinet,
now called INET following its merger with the Island
ECN, both were developed to meet the desires of
institutions to trade electronically with other institu-
tional traders. Moreover, the ability to hide liquidity
on ECNs by exposing only part of an order also
allowed institutions to better handle their trading
costs. But the needs of retail traders could also be
met more effectively by specialization. Firms such as
Madoff Securities developed payment for order flow
and trade improvement algorithms that lowered
retail trading costs. The speed of ECN execution
also appealed to day traders, a trading species little
seen when the NMS was contemplated.
An important feature of these new entrants to
the trading world is their private ownership. While
broker-dealers were always proprietary operations,
exchanges were organized as member-owned coop-
eratives. Even the Nasdaq, while starting life as a
proprietary system, became part of the NASD, the
member-owned securities association of broker-
dealers. Backed by private capital and unencum-
bered by antiquated governance structures, these
new corporate trading entities could quickly inno-
vate and develop in ways not available to the existing
markets. Indeed, at one point there were approxi-
mately a dozen ECNs active in the market although
their numbers have now consolidated dramatically.
Equally important, the regulatory burdens of these
new entities were substantially less than their
exchange or Nasdaq counterparts.3 The extensive
Perhaps no force has been more important 
in undermining the National Market System
structure than technology, which has enabled
the development of new trading systems by
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the self-regulatory structure that underlies equity
market supervision. Self-regulation rests on the
premise that it is in the exchange or market’s best
interest to curtail any untoward trading behavior.
While originally envisioned as a cost-effective way
to channel the expertise of the exchange members
into oversight obligations, the efficacy of the self-
regulatory organization (SRO) approach has been
questionable. As detailed by Seligman (2003b),
there is a long litany of SRO failures involving virtu-
ally every U.S. market or exchange. Of particular
importance for the current debate are the 1995
price fixing debacle on the Nasdaq, the 2000 floor
broker scandal on the Amex, and, most recently, the
$240 million settlement that will be paid by special-
ist firms on the NYSE to settle charges of stepping
ahead of customer orders.
What is particularly unsettling about these recent
failures is that they occurred while these exchanges
and markets were still essentially member-owned
cooperatives. Such a framework should temper, at
least in principle, rent-seeking behavior, as the wel-
fare of the market should be paramount over the ben-
efits of individual members. As exchanges move to
corporate ownership, however, the focus of a publicly
traded firm need not be so encompassing. Given the
incentives of profit-seeking firms, is self-regulation
a viable mechanism for market oversight? We will
return to this question in the next section.
The current realities of the market are thus far
removed from the visions that created it. Now, frag-
mented markets are the norm as order routing sys-
tems such as LAVA direct orders to various ECNs and
markets. Smart servers slice and dice orders as part
of dynamic trading strategies designed to recognize
explicitly the role of speed of execution and price
impact costs in overall trading costs. “Tradebots”
place limit orders, essentially transforming the pro-
vision of liquidity into a computerized process.
Faced with an ever-widening array of competitors,
exchanges and markets are shifting from being “pub-
lic utilities” to being publicly traded firms. As things
fall apart, the search for a new center beckons.
In the next section we turn to addressing some
specific issues in this quest—specifically, those
issues that relate to market structure. Our particu-
lar focus is on three very interrelated issues: how
markets should compete, how markets should be
linked, and how markets should be regulated.
Structural Issues
H
ow should markets compete? Fundamental
to the efficient operation of any market is com-
petition. Competitive forces ensure that markets
delays in launching the SuperMontage system, for
example, were at least partially due to the time it took
to get SEC approvals.
Perhaps not surprisingly, these same changes
were affecting equity markets throughout the world.
While ECNs played a much smaller role overseas,
technology revolutionized trading by providing elec-
tronic access across borders. Because larger mar-
kets are typically better able to match buyers and
sellers, the costs of providing liquidity generally falls
with scale. Enhanced technology also lowers trading
costs, leading to an ever-increasing arms race
between exchanges to develop new trading plat-
forms. For smaller exchanges, the dual demands of
larger scale and expensive technology have proved
insurmountable. The last ten years have seen the
mergers of fifteen exchanges in Europe alone.
One factor facilitating this consolidation has
been the worldwide shift of exchanges to public
ownership. While in 1995 there were no publicly
traded exchanges, now there are thirteen, with a
market value now approaching $30 billion dollars.4
Over this period, nineteen stock markets demu-
tualized, and several other markets, most recently
the Philadelphia Stock Exchange, have announced
their intention to seek a market listing. Of the
world’s ten largest stock markets, only the NYSE
and the Tokyo Stock Exchange are nonshareholder-
owned entities. This departure from the traditional
structure of member-owned cooperatives repre-
sents a shift not only for individual firms but also for
the broader exchange industry as well. Indeed, the
recent listing of the Chicago Mercantile Exchange
(CME) on the New York Stock Exchange testifies to
a similar governance revolution occurring in the
ranks of futures exchanges. Table 1 provides a list
of these publicly traded equity markets and their
market capitalization.
This shift to corporate ownership was surely not
envisioned by the framers of the NMS. While not in
principle inconsistent with a national market sys-
tem, corporate ownership does pose challenges for
While not in principle inconsistent with a
national market system, corporate owner-
ship does pose challenges for the self-
regulatory structure that underlies equity
market supervision.4. See Mendiola and O’Hara (2003) for an extensive analysis of the factors influencing exchange corporate governance and the
performance of these publicly listed exchanges.
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operate efficiently, providing investors with low-
cost access to fairly priced securities. At its simplest
level, competition in security markets involves price
setting, with the market maker or limit order trader
quoting the highest bid or the lowest offer making
the trade. Yet, as noted previously, even price com-
petition is complex if issues such as time priority
are included. And the advent of decimal pricing
(and even subpenny pricing) has demonstrated the
complex role played by the price grid in affecting
the provision of liquidity.
The competitive process becomes even more
complex if the competition occurs at the market
level rather than the trade level. Such competition
can take myriad forms, such as payment for order
flow, liquidity rebates, order form differences, and
competition over tape revenue. In the following
discussion, we consider only a few of these many
competitive options, beginning with the issue of
trade-through rules.
Priority rules. As discussed in the previous sec-
tion, priority rules for executing orders affect how
markets interact with their customers and with each
other. The primacy of price priority seems almost an
uncontestable proposition. With price priority, a
trader wishing to buy stock pays the lowest available
price and a trader wishing to sell receives the high-
est available price, an outcome surely in the inter-
ests of both sides. Yet the optimality of this simple
rule need not be so apparent when other dimensions
of the trade are considered. A trader wishing to buy
100,000 shares, for example, knows that the price he
pays will differ from that of a trader buying 100
shares. From the perspective of overall transactions
costs, would a trader offering to sell 100,000 shares
be a better match than executing the buy order
against several thousand orders already in the
queue? Similarly, might a trader wishing to execute
a trade quickly be better served by an execution that
takes place instantly at a worse price rather than
one at a better price with a few minutes’ delay?
Such issues are not specific to security markets.
Consider, for example, the simple problem of buying
milk. Someone running out of milk before breakfast
might greatly prefer to run to the local convenience
store to get a single bottle of milk quickly and pay
a higher price than at the local grocery store.
Alternatively, someone buying 300 gallons of milk
may find a better price at the dairy than at the gro-
cery store. Neither outcome seems unreasonable,
yet both violate the notion of strict price priority
across markets. What would seem unreasonable is
two customers at the convenience store at the same
time paying different prices for the milk; such an
outcome seems unfair, if not exploitative. This exam-
ple suggests that price priority within a market is
different from price priority across markets.
The debate over the trade-through rule in secu-
rities markets brings this distinction into focus. In
the current NMS design, strict price-time priority
Market
capitalization
Exchange Ticker IPO Listing date ($U.S. millions)
Singapore Stock Exchange SGX Yes 11-16-00 1,074.1
Athens Stock Exchange EXAE Yes 07-28-00 674.5
Deutsche Borse AG DB1 Yes 02-05-01 6,200.9
Oslo Bors ASA OSLO Yes 05-28-01 174.0
Euronext NXT Yes 07-10-01 3,608.2
Toronto Stock Exchange TSX Yes 11-12-01 1,523.7
Stockholm Stock Exchange OM Yes 01-01-93 1,505.8
Chicago Mercantile Exchange CME Yes 12-05-02 6,850.0
Australian Stock Exchange ASX No 10-14-98 1,498.0
Hong Kong Stock Exchange HKEX No 06-27-00 2,615.6
London Stock Exchange  LSE No 07-20-01 2,128.7
Nasdaq NDAQ No 07-01-02 591.2
ArcaEX AX Yes 08-16-04 686.3
Note: Market capitalization data are as of November 16, 2004.
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commodity and stocks are not. Microstructure the-
ory has developed a considerable body of work
showing that because of asymmetric information
the price of a stock depends upon the specifics of
the trade.7 Thus, buyers pay a bit more for the stock
because they may be trading on good private infor-
mation while sellers get a bit less to reflect a dis-
count for potential bad information. The size of the
spread depends, in part, on the scale and timing of
trades. The greater the order flow, the more unin-
formed orders there are to offset the informed
trades, thereby reducing the spread and price
impact of the trade. Such effects are not important
in buying milk because asymmetric information
issues are not important in milk pricing.
The current order-handling rules, by forcing
orders to the market with the best price, have aggre-
gated this liquidity into large pools. Virtually every
study of trading prices shows that the NYSE pro-
vides the lowest spread and price impact, a result
the exchange would attribute to its superior trading
system.8 But the new order rules would allow trades
to bypass the exchange either because of an explicit
opt-out by the trader or because of a worse, but
speedy, price available on an automated system. To
the extent that these exceptions are large, the pool
of orders remaining on the NYSE will be affected.
And, unlike in the milk example, the detrimental
impact on liquidity and price discovery can be large.
The NYSE has argued strenuously against chang-
ing the trade-through rules, citing the costs that
would arise just from executing trades at prices
from 1 to 4 cents off of the best quote. Indeed, the
NYSE provides empirical estimates ranging from
$1.5 billion to almost $3.5 billion due to this effect
alone (see NYSE 2004). Yet an even larger effect
may arise from the opt-out provision of the proposal.
To the extent that institutional traders elect to send
their orders away from the exchange, the overall
liquidity of the market will be lessened. A particular
concern is that orders will be internalized at the
large dealer firms, removing completely any expo-
sure of these orders in a public market. Such an
outcome could undermine the overall price discov-
ery mechanism, in effect making the market as a
whole worse off.
There are two general responses, and myriad
individual rejoinders, to this argument. The first is
that it is no longer clear that centralization is nec-
essary for price discovery or liquidity. Indeed, the
advent of electronic routing has made the reward to
posting better prices almost instantaneous, enhanc-
ing rather than detracting from market efficiency.
The active market for exchange-traded funds such
was intended to treat each order fairly. But the
delivery mechanisms in markets have changed in
part because the demands and motivations of
traders have changed. Thus, ECNs with automated
execution capabilities can execute a trade instanta-
neously, while the manual NYSE specialist system
requires more time. Under current rules, however,
if the NYSE is quoting a better price, an ECN par-
ticipating in the NMS must send the order there
even though it may take much longer (and prices
may change in the interim). This difficulty has
resulted in some ECNs opting to stay out of the
NMS, a strategy that has proved difficult to retain
given the current regulatory structure.5
The SEC has responded to this complaint by
proposing two exceptions to the current priority
rules. First, an automated, or fast, market can trade
through a better displayed price on a nonautomated
market if the price difference is no more than 1 to 5
cents (with the specific range depending on the
stock price). Second, a trader has the right to opt
out of the price priority protection if the trader
elects this option for each specific trade. Other than
for these exceptions, the SEC has retained the
trade-through rule and has proposed expanding it
to include all market centers. Thus, fast markets
cannot trade through other fast markets.6
These proposed changes respond both to the
changes in technology and to the concern that dif-
ferent traders face different trading problems and
so desire different trading outcomes. While accom-
plishing these objectives, the proposed changes are
not without their drawbacks. An immediate prob-
lem is that the rules would essentially force all mar-
kets to automate, an outcome directly at odds with
the specialist system of direct market making. A
second, and more fundamental, concern is that
these changes may lead to a dramatic deterioration
of liquidity and price discovery.
To understand this second concern, let’s return
to our milk example. One difference between secu-
rity markets and grocery markets is that milk is a
The current order-handling rules, by forcing
orders to the market with the best price, have
aggregated liquidity into large pools.5. If an ECN does not publicly post quotes, then it is able to trade through the price. An example of this is Instinet, which
remained outside of the NMS although its competitors ARCA and Brut did participate in the NMS. Alternatively, Island,
which did have publicly exposed quotes, opted to “go dark” rather than comply with the SEC’s rules regarding access
(a stance which it has now reversed). See Hendershott and Jones (forthcoming) for an interesting analysis of this Island
transparency case.
6. A fast market could match the better price of another fast market and execute the trade. Thus, the new system envisions
retaining price priority across markets but not time priority.
7. For a review of microstructure theory, see O’Hara (1995). A more detailed analysis of the role of markets in liquidity and
price discovery is O’Hara (2003).
8. Representative studies are Bessembinder (2003, 1999), Boehmer (2003), and Jones and Lipson (2003).
9. Exchange-traded funds (ETFs) are portfolios of securities that trade as a single entity. Among the most active is the QQQ, which
is composed of the 100 largest Nasdaq stocks. ETFs trade actively on ECNs, on the Nasdaq, and on the various exchanges.
10. Indeed, the SEC appears to be divided on this opt-out issue, as evidenced by a new proposal reportedly circulated to the
commissioners in late November 2004. This new proposal would back away from allowing traders to opt out of price prior-
ity although specific details of the plan are not yet publicly available. See “SEC Preps ‘Best-Price’ Overhaul,” Wall Street
Journal, November 22, 2004, for more discussion.
11. In particular, Instinet reported to the Alternative Display Facility (ADF), Island reported to the Cincinnati Stock Exchange,
Brut reported to the Boston Stock Exchange, and Archipelago joined forces with the then Pacific Exchange.
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as the QQQ suggests that liquidity can obtain in
fragmented trading, at least for the most active
securities.9 This trading flexibility has led some
institutional traders to cite a preference for the
fragmented trading of Nasdaq stocks relative to the
centralized trading of listed stocks. The second
response points to the requirements of best execu-
tion in obviating the need for a trade-through rule.
As noted earlier, the difficulties inherent in even
defining, let alone attaining, best execution are not
insignificant. Potentially offsetting this, however,
are the competitive pressures that impose best exe-
cution not by fiat but by the demands of customers
for better performance from their broker-dealers.
The challenge facing the SEC, then, is to enhance
the competition for orders without so weakening the
market fundamentals of liquidity and price discovery
that “the center falls apart.” Increased electronic
execution capabilities on the exchanges will amelio-
rate some of these concerns, but the overall issue of
whether orders can, or should, opt out of price pri-
ority remains contentious.10
Tape revenue. Competition across markets can
take place on many levels, with one of the most
important involving the revenue that arises from
selling trade and quote information. As noted in the
previous section, the development of consolidated
trade and quote data was fundamental to the for-
mation of a national market system. One approach
to providing trades and quotes would be to have a
governmental entity collect and disseminate this
information in much the way that the National
Weather Service provides temperature and climate
data. This governmental solution was rejected, how-
ever, in favor of a quasi-private-sector approach. In
particular, the Consolidated Tape Association (CTA),
an entity owned by the exchanges and the Nasdaq,
collects and sells data from the exchanges and mar-
kets. The CTA, in turn, provides tape revenue to the
exchanges and markets via a formula based on the
number of trades or prints to the consolidated tape.
In recent years, this sharing mechanism has
come under attack from many directions. Under
current rules the tape revenues are distributed to
entities on the basis of the number of trades or share
volume reported by the SRO that regulates them.
Originally, the tape revenue was shared by the
exchanges and the NASD, but the development of
ECNs set forth demands for the sharing of the rev-
enue to these entities. These demands were exac-
erbated by the introduction of the SuperMontage
trading system on the Nasdaq, which essentially
transformed that market into an ECN of its own. In
response, a number of ECNs shifted to reporting
trades on other venues where they were given
rebates on the tape revenue they generated.11
A second criticism of this sharing mechanism is
that it introduces perverse incentives into the mar-
ket. In particular, because more trades mean more
revenue, trades are shredded into numerous smaller
trades and thus into greater numbers of prints. The
SEC has also raised concerns over the existence of
The challenge facing the SEC is to enhance
the competition for orders without so weaken-
ing the market fundamentals of liquidity and
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While this seems a desirable outcome, there
remains the underlying issue of whether the data
should be sold at all. Indeed, ECNs routinely give
away limit order book data, information surely of
value to traders and the market. A more fundamen-
tal argument with respect to the trade and quote
data is that it is not the market that creates the data
but rather the buyers, sellers, and limit order traders
who transact there. How do they benefit from this
proposed sharing rule? One argument for excluding
them is that the revenue streams, in turn, are nec-
essary to pay for the self-regulatory functions of the
market. In effect, the market revenue data pay for
the oversight of the market, and this oversight in
turn benefits all traders. Yet, as will be argued later
in this section, the self-regulatory structure may be
problematic for many reasons. Moreover, if the goal
is to promote quality regulation, then it may be that
the costs of such regulation are not well reflected by
a formula that ties revenues to trades and quotes
and not to the costs of actual oversight.
Pennies, subpennies, and limit orders. A third
dimension to the competitive calculus of recent con-
cern is the pricing metric. For more than a century,
the U.S. equity markets quoted securities prices in
eighths, a convention designed to minimize transac-
tions costs by reducing the number of possible price
points. This system worked reasonably well when
the transactions costs of trading were sufficiently
high that spreads were often a multiple of the mini-
mum increment. But in recent years enhanced tech-
nology and increased competition drove equilibrium
spreads for many securities below that level. With
minimum spreads fixed at mandated levels, however,
practices such as payment for order flow arose to
reallocate the excess spread revenues.
The SEC responded in the late nineties by allow-
ing decimal pricing, a process that was completed in
early 2001. As shown by numerous research studies
(see, for example, Bacidore 1997; Goldstein and
Kavajecz 2000; Jones and Lipson 2003), the imme-
diate impact of this change was to reduce both
quoted and effective spreads for small orders. A less
positive development was a similar fall in market
depth for many securities. Market depth fell
because the smaller price grid undermined the
attractiveness of placing limit orders. Whereas
under the old system a market maker or floor bro-
ker would have to better an existing limit order by
an eighth to establish priority at the quote, now this
enhanced priority could be accomplished by
improving the quote by a penny. This “pennying”
behavior undercut the value of placing a limit order,
and consequently displayed liquidity fell. Thus, the
wash sales, or trades reported solely for the pur-
pose of printing more trades. Similarly, some
venues exist purely as print facilities for the pur-
poses of garnering print revenue. Competition over
tape revenue has thus emerged as an important
vector in the competition between markets.
This new competitive dimension raises a number
of important questions. Perhaps the most significant
of these is, what activity is print revenue intended
to reward? Presumably, tape data are valuable
because trades and quotes represent the state of the
market. While any individual data point is relatively
valueless, the aggregation of the data is not, and in
this sense market data are like a public good: The
data’s existence benefits all, but data emerge from
collective and not individual actions. One solution to
the problem of selling a public good is simply to give
it away or, in this case, to disseminate the data
freely. But this approach ignores the fact that the
data are not costless to produce. The alternative
approach is to allocate the revenue to the markets in
proportion to the value they have created.
But what exactly is this value? The current rules
reward the printing of trades but ignore the fact
that not all trades are equally informative as to the
state of the market. For example, a large trade may
be much more informative than a small one, partic-
ularly if the small trade is the product of a trade-
shredding algorithm. A related issue is that for many
traders quote data are the relevant state variable,
yet the production of quote data is not even consid-
ered in the revenue-sharing rule.
The SEC has responded to these concerns by
proposing in Regulation NMS a new formula that
would divide market data revenue between trades
and quote production. The goal would be to reward
markets that provide the “best” quotes, measured
in term of time at the inside spread or potentially
with respect to other variables such as the size of
the quote. The notion here is to better link the rev-
enue to a market with the underlying value that
market is creating.
If the goal is to promote quality regulation, then
the costs of such regulation may not be well
reflected by a formula that ties revenues to
trades and quotes and not to oversight costs.12. Island actually lowered its minimum tick size from 1/256 to 1/1000 in April 2001. See Biais, Bisière, and Spatt (2003) for a
very interesting analysis of tick size and competition between Nasdaq and Island.
13. INET announced that effective March 8, 2004, they would eliminate trading in subpenny increments for all stocks trading
over $1.00 with the exception of the Nasdaq QQQ. INET attributed this decision to the results of a pilot study, concluding
“we have determined that trading in penny increments generally provides greater price discovery, market transparency, and
overall execution quality on INET in the current environment.” See INET Subscriber e-mail, March 1, 2004.
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shift to decimal pricing produced lower transaction
costs at the expense of lower displayed liquidity.
Perhaps not surprisingly, price competition then
evolved to some venues quoting prices in subpenny
increments. The INET ATS (formerly the Island
ECN), for example, allowed subpenny pricing for all
securities, while the Instinet ECN permitted sub-
penny trading for all stocks trading over $10.00.12
The SEC has responded in Regulation NMS with a
proposed ban on subpenny pricing for stocks trading
above one dollar. The rationale for this prohibition is
to protect the value of limit orders from pernicious
subpennying behavior. Thus, while shifting to sub-
pennies would reduce spreads for some traders, the
SEC argues that the overall market liquidity costs
of doing so exceed these benefits.13
This debate illustrates the complex role played
by price competition and the pricing grid. Indeed,
some argue that the SEC should have moved more
forcefully by restricting prices to a larger grid. Yet
there are also concerns that limit orders traders are
imposing costs on the market by causing flickering
quotes. In particular, by placing and then rapidly
canceling limit orders, these traders cause the dis-
played bid or ask quote to flicker. This practice is a
particular problem on ECNs, where, as Hasbrouck
and Saar (2002) provide evidence, more than 25
percent of all submitted orders are cancelled within
two seconds of submission. But even markets such
as the NYSE are not immune to this problem.
The proposed Regulation NMS does not address
this problem. Certainly, one solution is to require
that all posted limit orders have a minimum dura-
tion. Opponents of such a rule argue that it restricts
the trading strategies of active traders who rely on
the flexibility to change orders quickly. And it is
always within the purview of an individual market
to restrict cancellations, either explicitly or by
charging fees for cancellations. Alternatively, what
may be needed is a new type of price-contingent
limit order that would allow limit order traders to
prespecify price revision contingencies, thereby
obviating the need for cancellations. Nonetheless,
whether individual gains, or even the actions of
individual markets, are sufficient to offset the losses
to the market as a whole from unstable quotes
remains a contentious, and important, issue.
How should markets be linked? The issues
addressed above concern the various ways trading
venues compete. But how an individual venue
chooses to compete is not independent of how the
trading venues are linked together to form the mar-
ket. Market linkages involve many dimensions, but
among the most important are who can place orders
in the market, who can access them, and how easy
it is for this to occur. This linkage issue is at the
heart of the debate over the NMS, and not surpris-
ingly it is a focus of the new SEC proposal. The SEC
proposal has raised a wide range of linkage issues,
including the problems of locked and crossed mar-
kets, and the difficulties of the current ITS system
in handling automated executions. Brevity necessi-
tates selectivity, so rather than address these
(admittedly important) issues, I turn our attention
instead to the basic issue of access fees and access
rights in market linkages.
Access fees. The original NMS envisioned orders
freely flowing to the market quoting the best price.
To facilitate this outcome, orders entered into the
ITS could be electronically sent to any participat-
ing venue, with no venue permitted to charge
explicit access fees for sending or receiving the
order. Similarly, while Nasdaq-listed securities
were not explicitly part of the ITS, broker-dealers
placing quotes in the Nasdaq were also not permit-
ted to charge access fees for executing against
their quotes. In effect, the specialists and market
makers in these venues earned profits from exe-
cuting trade.
The development of ECNs, however, introduced a
new business model into the competitive environment.
Unlike in an exchange or dealer market where a
Market linkages involve many dimensions, but
among the most important are who can place
orders in the market, who can access them,
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the advantage of fostering true best execution by
making the actual trading price more explicit. The
SEC rejected this approach, however, and instead
mandated in Regulation NMS a maximum access fee
that can be charged for any transaction. The pro-
posed regulation caps access fees at 0.001 cents per
share, with a maximum access charge per transac-
tion capped at 0.02 cents. An important aspect of
this proposal is that broker-dealers can now charge
access fees, as can ITS exchange members. A nat-
ural outcome would be to expect that all trades now
will involve explicit access charges whereas before
many did not.
The advantage to this approach is that it stan-
dardizes fees and removes the ability to gouge
noncustomers at the expense of customers. The
disadvantage is that it arbitrarily imposes a price ceil-
ing on the transaction and removes any role for mar-
ket forces in setting access fees. Indeed, it can be
argued that the access fee issue is relevant only
because trade-through rules require orders be routed
to the lowest price; in the absence of this requirement
broker-dealers would choose to route orders based
on overall costs, thus allowing market forces to set
access charges.16 With Regulation NMS now extend-
ing trade-through rules to all markets, the effect of
these mandated fees will be widespread. From this
perspective, the SEC’s approach is both anticom-
petitive and inconsistent with the general view that
market prices are best set by the market.
Who can access markets? The SEC-mandated
approach to access fees contrasts with the market-
based approach the SEC is proposing to deal with
the more general issue of how markets are to be
linked. Here the SEC is stepping away from the
hard linkages of the ITS to allow market forces to
link markets together. Currently, “there is no exist-
ing ‘hard wired’ linkage for Nasdaq stocks other
than the telephonic access required by the Nasdaq
UTP Plan and the minimum access standards of the
ADF” (SEC 2004, 22). Instead, access is provided by
a mélange of linkages that participants in the ADF
have established amongst themselves. The SEC is
proposing that quoting market centers and quoting
market participants must make their quotations
accessible to all market participants “on terms as
favorable as it grants to its most preferred member,
customer, or subscriber.”17 Further, “an SRO would
not be permitted to post quotes or orders for another
market center (such as an ATS or market maker)
through its facilities unless it has first made a deter-
mination that the market center has provided ade-
quate access to its quotes and orders under the
proposed access standards.” From a practical per-
market maker provides liquidity, liquidity in an
ECN arises endogenously from the submitted
orders. To operate the system, an ECN charges
customers explicit access fees. Because liquidity
providers are generally more valuable to an elec-
tronic limit order book than are liquidity deman-
ders, most ECNs charge a fee to take liquidity
(that is, execute against an existing limit order) and
provide a rebate to customers who “make” liquid-
ity by placing a limit order.14 Thus, the overall cost
of trading on the ECN involves both the bid-ask
spread and these access fees or rebates.15
Originally, only customers of the ECN could
submit orders and execute against existing orders.
Regulation ATS changed this practice by requiring
any ECN with at least 5 percent of the trading vol-
ume in a security to display its quotes in a public
quotation system; an ATS with 20 percent or more
of the trading volume was required to provide fair
access to its system. This requirement was intended
to foster best execution by providing all traders
with access to the “best” price. While laudable in
principle, this required linkage introduced several
complications to the trading process. First, the
quoted price of the ECN did not explicitly include
the access fee. Thus, the quote montage, while
reflecting the best price, did not actually reflect the
lowest execution cost. To the extent that a trade-
through rule applied to the order, a broker-dealer
would have to send the order to the ECN for exe-
cution even though the overall cost could be higher.
A second problem involved the size of the access
fees. While noncustomers could execute against an
order, they could not similarly place an order on the
ECN. By charging large access fees, ECNs could
then afford to pay large liquidity rebates to their
customers. The competitive metric thus involved
using access fees to subsidize customers at the
expense of noncustomers.
Certainly, one solution to this problem would be
to change the quote montage to reflect the price
plus the access fee. This approach would have had
Recent regulatory failures at the Nasdaq, the
Amex, and the NYSE suggest that even the
most effective markets have struggled with
controlling the interests of their members.14. Rebates were introduced by Island in 1997 and have gradually become the norm in ECN trading.
15. There are, of course, indirect fees that attach to trading on other venues, such as the seat prices or Designated Order
Turnaround (DOT) fees on the NYSE or the SuperMontage access fees in Nasdaq.
16. The Nasdaq market currently does not have a trade-through rule, and at least some observers argue that the access-fee issue
there has been largely dealt with by market forces and by the cap of 0.03 cents per transaction set by the Nasdaq.
17. Under new Rule 600, a quoting market center is any order execution facility that is required to make available to a quota-
tion vender its best bid or best offer in a security pursuant to the Quote Rule. A quoting market participant is any broker-
dealer that provides its best bid or best offer in a security to an exchange or association pursuant to the Quote Rule or
Regulation ATS and whose best bid or best offer is not otherwise available through a quoting market center.
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spective, this linkage requirement essentially
imposes direct access obligations on ADF partici-
pants that have not yet established linkages with
quoting market centers.
Exactly how this connection will be done
remains to be seen. What is important is that unlike
the market-to-market linkages characterizing the
ITS system, this system envisions indirect linkages
through a member, customer, or subscriber. Such
an approach seems more consistent with the new
market structure of multiple electronic trading
venues competing at the customer level. As this
approach will also create greater access to markets,
an interesting question is how this will affect the
current value of exchange seats, which traditionally
have reflected the value of access. The recent fall in
NYSE prices suggests at least a partial answer.
How should markets be regulated? The mar-
ket structure issues discussed in the previous two
subsections illustrate the dramatic changes in equity
markets since the inception of the National Market
System. Yet a more fundamental change is on the
horizon, one that has the potential to influence the
operations of the U.S. equity markets in ways even
more profound. I refer here to the changing corpo-
rate governance of exchanges and markets.
As noted earlier, stock exchanges around the
world are converting from being member-owned
cooperatives to being publicly traded firms. This
shift reflects a variety of causes, including greater
access to capital, the need for greater efficiency in
operation, and the increasing heterogeneity of mem-
bers’ interests leading to difficulties in cooperative
decision making. As discussed by Mendiola and
O’Hara (2003), this change is both widespread and
accelerating; eight of the world’s ten largest stock
markets are now publicly traded firms, with pro-
posed conversions pending for several other mar-
kets. In the United States, the Nasdaq, the CME, and
ArcaEx (the entity combining the Archipelago ECN
and the Pacific Stock Exchange) currently have
traded shares, and the Philadelphia Stock Exchange
has announced plans to convert to public ownership.
While the change in corporate governance should
influence exchange operation, a more intriguing issue
is how it will influence exchange regulation. U.S.
equity markets and exchanges rely on a system of
self-regulation. As detailed by Seligman (2003b), the
decision to eschew direct government regulation
reflected the view that “self-regulation would have
‘unquestioned advantage’ over direct SEC enforce-
ment” because of the problems of regulating behav-
ior that was undesirable but not easily proscribed
by statute” (Seligman 2003b, 12). With direct regu-
lation left to the SRO, the government would play a
residual role, being ready to use “the shotgun behind
the door” should the members fail to satisfactorily
police themselves.
That self-regulation has not always worked well
is unquestioned. Recent regulatory failures at the
Nasdaq, the Amex, and the NYSE suggest that even
the most effective markets have struggled with con-
trolling the interests of their members. As exchanges
shift from cooperative governance to corporate own-
ership, however, the very concept of self-regulation
is called into question. Is it even sensible to expect
a private firm to put the interests of the market
ahead of those of its shareholders?
While the United States has yet to address this
specific issue, the transition of exchanges to corpo-
rate ownership around the world has forced other
countries to confront the regulatory question.
Interestingly, while the problem of regulating these
exchanges is essentially the same, the solutions
being adopted show little uniformity. Table 2 sets
out the regulatory framework currently used for the
London Stock Exchange, the Toronto Stock
Exchange, Euronext, the Deutsche Borse, and the
Stockholm Stock Exchange (OM).
Perhaps the most dramatic shift in regulatory
structure has occurred in the United Kingdom,
where in 2000 the Financial Services Authority (FSA)
took over general oversight of the London Stock
Exchange. This “super regulator” engages in all
aspects of financial regulation, including the oversight
of banking, insurance, and the stock market. The
London Stock Exchange continues to have responsi-
bility for monitoring daily trading operations on the
exchange, but the FSA has taken over the power
to list and delist securities. This new role allows the48 Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta ECONOMIC REVIEW Fourth Quarter 2004
Stock Public Self- Regulation entity if
market listed/mutual regulated? not self-regulated
London Public listed No
Toronto (TSX) Public listed Partially
Euronext Listed public Yes
Deutsche Borse  Public No
(Frankfurt Stock 
Exchange)
OM (Stockholm) Public listed No
Sources: London (LSE): www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/policy/launch.pdf; Toronto (TSX): www.rs.ca/en/about/index.asp?printVersion=no&locl=about; 
Euronext: www.euronext.com/editorial/wide/0,4771,1732_4436322,00.html; Deutsche Borse (Frankfurt Stock Exchange):www.boersenaufsicht.de/
hessen.htm; OM (Stockholm): www.fi.se/english/index.asp 
TABLE 2
Regulation of Stock Exchanges
FSA (Financial Service Authority)
Market Regulation Services Inc. (RS)
A national, independent, not-for-profit regula-
tion services provider, jointly owned by TSX
and the Investment Dealers Association of
Canada
Exchange Supervisory Authority (under the
Hessian Ministry of Economics)
Finansinspektionen (FI), the Swedish Financial
Supervisory Authority
A public authority that supervises and moni-
tors companies operating in financial markets.
(The Swedish Parliament and the Swedish
government have stipulated that SFSA should
contribute to the stability and efficiency of the
financial sector and promote satisfactory 
consumer protection.)49 Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta ECONOMIC REVIEW Fourth Quarter 2004
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The regulation arm of the London Stock Exchange was transferred to FSA in 2000. FSA has
engaged in every aspect of regulatory activities in the exchange:
• to promote fairness, transparency, and orderly conduct in financial markets, looking in the first
instance to the markets and market participants to set and enforce high standards in this area; and
• to take action where such standards are inadequate or are ineffectively enforced.
RS’s areas of regulatory responsibility include market policy, market surveillance, investigations,
and enforcement.
• Market policy: RS develops and administers trading rules applicable to all marketplaces in
Canada, the Universal Market Integrity Rules (UMIR).
• Market surveillance: RS monitors every trade every day made in Canada in real time to ensure
strict compliance with UMIR.
• Investigations: RS conducts investigations into trading activities in response to complaints or
any market activity identified during its market surveillance that could be construed as violat-
ing securities trading rules, policies, and statutes.
• Enforcement: RS is responsible for enforcing the proper and fair conduct of regulated individu-
als and firms and can impose fines of up to $1 million per violation depending on the severity
of the violation and can suspend or ban individuals from access to the market.
In accordance with Dutch law, Euronext has a two-tier governance structure with a Supervisory
Board and a Managing Board.
• The Supervisory Board is a separate body, consisting of independent members, and the members
of the Supervisory Board cannot also be members of the Managing Board at the same time.
• The Supervisory Board oversees the actions and policies of the Managing Board and the general
course of Euronext’s business activities and assists and advises, in its supervisory capacity,
the Managing Board in performing its managerial duties.
• Major decisions require previous approval ofthe Supervisory Board. Among others, its duties
include the adoption of the financial statements that all members of the Supervisory Board
and the Managing Board must sign.
The Exchange Supervisory Authority supervises
• price formation processes,
• investigation of violations against the exchange rules and regulations,
• development of fraud prevention,
• supervision of lawful conduct by exchange bodies,
• supervision of trading participants admitted to exchange trading, and 
• the legislation and exchange policy.
FI ensures timely implementation of measures against suspected illegal trading.
FI supervises compliance with the Swedish Insider Act and investigates cases of suspected
offences and share price manipulations.
FI established new rules of conduct for the securities market concerning increased information about
the risks and documentation requirements for advisory meetings. These governing rules include
• trading information from and to customers;
• handling documents of business engagement;
• employees’ and related parties’ own transactions with financial instruments and foreign currencies;
• allotment rules in conjunction with public tender offer, etc.;
• suspension of trading; and
• reporting obligation in conjunction with trades regarding financial instruments.50 Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta ECONOMIC REVIEW Fourth Quarter 2004
traded exchanges. Nonetheless, a feature com-
mon to all approaches is independence between
the supervisory authority and the management of
the exchange or market. This structure differs
from the typical U.S. model, where the regulatory
function is carried on directly by the exchange.18
When exchanges were cooperatively owned and
not profit-seeking, this distinction between man-
agement and supervision may have been less
important. In a world of profit-seeking exchanges,
however, the mandates of management and super-
vision are likely to diverge.
There is little doubt that the U.S. markets will
evolve toward the private ownership structure now
so prevalent elsewhere. The SEC, however, has
given scant attention to the implications of this
shift, focusing instead on amending the rules of the
National Market System as opposed to changing the
regulatory structure of the equity markets.19
Nonetheless, the recurrent, and highly public, scan-
dals involving U.S. equity market governance and
regulation suggest that attention to this important
issue is overdue. The recent corporate governance
reforms at the NYSE suggest that individual mar-
kets may adopt some changes, but the real issue
remains how to regulate U.S. markets operating as
profit-seeking, publicly owned firms.
As a starting point for this discussion, let us
briefly outline how these regulatory alternatives
could be applied to the U.S. markets.
Super-regulator. Following the U.K. model, the
regulatory functions of each exchange would be
shared between the market and the SEC. The SEC
would be responsible for marketwide regulation,
such as the setting of listing and delisting stan-
dards, the setting of disclosure and corporate gov-
ernance regulations, and the overall monitoring of
market fairness and transparency. The exchange
would be responsible for the monitoring of all trad-
ing on its trading platforms. One aspect of this reg-
ulatory arrangement is that listing fees would no
longer be a revenue source for the exchange but
instead would accrue to the SEC. Centralizing reg-
ulation has several advantages, among them consis-
tency across markets, uniform control of access to
the U.S. equity markets, and the removal of self-
serving interests from market regulation. But the
disadvantages are substantial, with perhaps the
foremost being the dramatic expansion of govern-
ment involvement in the securities markets. This
approach also reduces the value of industry exper-
tise, both in terms of efficiency and expense.
Industry-sponsored SRO. The Canadian approach
suggests that an industry-sponsored SRO could be
government regulator to decide who should have
access to the U.K. capital markets, a decision for-
merly within the purview of the exchange itself.
Direct government supervision is the case for the
Deutsche Borse, where the Exchange Supervisory
Authority controls virtually all aspects of trade
monitoring, listing, and supervision. The Stockholm
market is also under direct supervision and is over-
seen by the Finansinpektionen (FI), a public author-
ity set up to supervise and monitor companies
operating in the financial markets. The Stockholm
Exchange represents a particularly interesting
example, as this market is completely owned by the
technology company OM.
In contrast to the these directly regulated markets,
the Euronext market has retained a self-regulatory
structure. Euronext, however, has an intriguing two-
tiered governance structure involving a Supervisory
Board and a Managing Board. The Supervisory Board
is composed of independent members, who cannot by
law also serve on the Managing Board. While the
Managing Board is responsible for running the com-
pany, the Supervisory Board oversees all exchange
activities and is responsible for the overall regulation
of the market. In accordance with Dutch law, all major
decisions require the approval of the Supervisory
Board, and the members of both boards are required
to sign all financial statements.
Yet another regulatory variant is found in the
regulation of the Toronto Stock Exchange. Canadian
regulation is entrusted to Market Regulation Services,
Inc. (RS), a national, independent, not-for-profit reg-
ulation services provider that is jointly owned by the
Toronto Stock Exchange and the Investment Dealers
Association of Canada. As an industry-run SRO, RS
retains the basic self-regulatory approach but
removes the influence of specific exchange owner-
ship. Thus, RS is responsible for trade monitoring,
enforcement, rule setting, and enforcement for all
security markets in Canada.
These alternative regulatory models suggest
that there may be many ways to regulate publicly
There is little doubt that the U.S. markets will
evolve toward the private ownership structure
now so prevalent elsewhere.18. An exception to this is found in the reorganization of Nasdaq, where following the price-fixing scandal the regulatory arm
was split off to form NASDR. NASDR is now separated from the Nasdaq market, but both are owned by the NASD. In a sim-
ilar vein, ARCA outsourced its regulation to the Pacific Exchange (PCX) although their subsequent merger renders this dis-
tinction less clear-cut.
19. On November 9, 2004, the SEC proposed rules that would strengthen the corporate governance of markets that operate as
SROs. The proposed changes require SROs to publicly disclose compensation of top executives and to have a majority of
directors be independent. The proposal also seeks to limit a single member to owning no more than 20 percent of a publicly
owned exchange or market. These changes, while useful, do not address the inherent conflicts noted above in profit-seek-
ing firms’ self-regulating. For more discussion of these issues, see Macey and O’Hara (2004).
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applied to the U.S. markets. This model would require
shifting all regulatory responsibilities from the indi-
vidual exchanges and markets to a central non-
governmental regulator. This regulatory model
retains the role of industry expertise but also the
perverse incentives of allowing industry partici-
pants to regulate themselves. An objection to this
approach, as well as to the super-regulator model, is
that it also removes a competitive dimension from
markets. For example, the NYSE has long viewed
the value of its market monitoring as an important
benefit to NYSE listing. However, an important ben-
efit is that it removes the incentive of individual
markets to compete via lower regulatory require-
ments. Such regulatory arbitrage is a particular con-
cern as profit-seeking markets compete for listing
and trading revenues.
Enhanced self-regulation. A third alternative
is to retain the general self-regulatory approach but
with changes to address the specific incentive prob-
lems attaching to proprietary exchange or market
operation. The NASDR model suggests one possi-
ble framework, with the regulatory arm structured
as a separate entity from the parent organization.
Alternatively, the NYSE is proposing retaining its
regulatory arm in-house but changing the reporting
lines to go directly to the board. Unlike the Euronext
model, however, there is only one board at the
NYSE, so management and supervisory decisions
would still reside in the same group. An added dis-
advantage of this approach is that it retains multiple
regulators, an expensive and costly approach that
ignores the scale benefits of standardized technology
for market oversight. Perhaps more importantly, this
approach retains the premise that profit-seeking
firms can be trusted to regulate themselves, a ques-
tionable assumption given the recurring scandals
in U.S. equity markets.
In my view, these regulatory issues are funda-
mental to the search for a new center for the U.S.
equity markets. The current regulatory framework
evolved from the pre-SEC days when markets
essentially oversaw their own trading environment.
Their failure to do so effectively, however, was in
large part responsible for the formation of the SEC
in the Exchange Act of 1934 and the creation of the
NASD in the Maloney Act of 1938. Regardless of
one’s view of the efficacy of self-regulation since
then, the changing economic environment now raises
serious concerns about the appropriateness of self-
regulation going forward.
Conclusions
The best lack all conviction, while the worst are full
of passionate intensity.
—W.B. Yeats, “The Second Coming”
T
he challenges confronting markets and regula-
tors are substantial. This paper has set out a
number of issues relating to how markets compete,
how markets are linked, and how markets are regu-
lated. As is readily conceded, this list is incomplete,
reflecting the complexity of our U.S. market struc-
ture. Nonetheless, what I have tried to outline here
are the changes that I think have undermined the
current structure of the U.S. markets and the issues
that must be addressed as a consequence. A partic-
ular challenge is how to deal with the transition of
markets from cooperatively owned organizations to
profit-seeking, publicly listed firms.
The SEC’s Regulation NMS is a promising start in
this direction, providing a number of much-needed
changes for the market. But it is an incremental
approach, changing particular features of the mar-
kets while retaining the basic structure that has
been in place since the inception of the National
Market System. My argument in this paper is that
Regulation NMS does not go deep enough—that
a new vision, rather than piecemeal changes, is
needed to address the fundamental changes that
are shaping the equity markets. While incremental
changes may ultimately bring improvement, a more
likely result is a market structure increasingly at odds
with its economic reality.
In crafting this new vision, perhaps the most
important issue to consider is the nature of compe-
tition in U.S. securities markets. The NMS was
crafted to deal with an unequal world of dominant
markets interacting with smaller competitors. The
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must provide the proper oversight to ensure fair
and appropriate behavior.
As Yeats reminds us, the dual perils of indecision
and haste can equally undermine the prospects for
success. As markets and regulators grapple with
solutions to these problems, the most important
element in finding a new center may be the courage
to make the necessary changes.
competitive behavior while retaining a role for the
smaller competitors. The new reality is that markets
are technology driven, often fragmented, but highly
competitive. This competitive nature can allow the
market to resolve many competitive issues such as
pricing and access without direct interference from
the SEC. But, as I have argued here, where direc-
tion is needed is at the firm level, where regulation
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